South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol came to Tokyo this week to meet with his Japanese counterpart, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, in a hint of further diplomatic softening. Due to concerns in South Korea–Japan relations, it was the first official visit of a South Korean president to Tokyo in 12 years. Yoon’s visit comes just over 10 days after the two presidents reached an agreement to settle a disagreement over South Korea’s 2018 court verdict against Japanese corporations’ use of forced Korean labor during World War II.
Few issues between Japan and South Korea command as much attention and political capital while yielding as fragile outcomes as historical reconciliation. Yet, all of these reconciliation initiatives have been fundamentally faulty, whether in terms of procedure, substance, or seeming insincerity. Because of Japan’s history of ineffective apologies and accords, many Koreans believe the country has not fully expressed remorse for its colonial sins. Meanwhile, some Japanese have „apology fatigue” which results from giving multiple apologies without witnessing long-term changes in relations.
The names of the bodies of water separating Japan and the Korean Peninsula, Sea of Japan or East Sea; sovereignty over a group of rocky islets between the two countries (Dokdo/Takeshima); the legality of Japan’s colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945; and the treatment of sexual slaves, also known as „comfort women”, by the Japanese imperial military during the course of the conflict are among the many areas of historical tension between South Korea and Japan. These historical grievances often spill over into non-historical disagreements, such as Japan’s decision to dump Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant wastewater in 2021 and its 2019 tightening of export regulations on chemicals used by South Korea’s semiconductor sector.
Background
While South Korea and Japan restored ties in 1965, unsolved historical issues continue to obstruct real bilateral reconciliation and effective diplomatic, security, and economic cooperation. Previous attempts to enhance ties, both bilaterally and trilaterally with the US, have traditionally stressed a „future-oriented” strategy centered on joint security and economic objectives. Without a comprehensive settlement to historical difficulties, „future-oriented” bilateral cooperation on diplomatic, security, and economic issues would be restricted and unsatisfactory. Poor ties between the US and its two closest regional allies are not just an irritation, but also a direct danger to the US’s long-standing objective of creating a network of allies in the area, as well as its current goal of attaining integrated deterrence as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
Yet, despite previous attempts to resolve Japan’s imperial heritage, historical disagreements may grow and generate regions of enmity that harm future ties. For example, after Japan’s decision in August 2019 to remove South Korea from its „white list” of trustworthy economic partners, South Korean President Moon Jae-in said in an emergency cabinet meeting that „we [South Korea] will never again lose to Japan.” Japan’s export restrictions disrupted South Korean supply lines, forcing the Moon administration to rely on local suppliers and other nations to manage its increased economic vulnerability. This trade conflict, which arose as a result of a court judgement on forced laborers in 2018, was as much a reflection of present economic warfare and national pride as it was unresolved history.
Conservative South Korean leaders’ attempts to repair ties with Japan have been pragmatic but unpopular. They focused on security and economic concerns while dismissing their opponents. Yet, this strategy has never resulted in the type of long-term goodwill that exists between South Korea and Japan that exists among NATO members. However, these attempts have been faced with persistent criticism for failing to address territorial issues and compensate Korean victims of Japanese colonization. The 2015 comfort women agreement, South Korea’s final important accord with Japan, disintegrated fast after progressive reformer Moon Jae-in was elected president in 2017. Moon’s cancellation of the deal, as well as the South Korean Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment ordering Japanese corporations to pay compensation to World War II-era forced labor victims, hastened the deterioration of ties between Tokyo and Seoul. The Abe administration imposed tighter limits on technology exports to South Korea, resulting in local boycotts of Japanese products and Seoul’s attempts to minimize its economic dependency on Japan via increased R&D expenditure.
A promising summit
Nonetheless, the recent Yoon-Kishida meeting offers a diplomatic boost to Seoul and Tokyo, as well as a more political impetus to develop a „future-oriented” bilateral partnership. Much of the rapprochement between the two neighbors is motivated by growing security concerns about Pyongyang’s repeated missile tests, China’s escalating military posture, and tensions across the Taiwan Strait, which both Tokyo and Seoul regard as critical to their respective security. The event also speaks well for enhanced trilateral ties between the United States, Japan, and South Korea. As a result, it has a favorable impact on the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific Strategy. Nonetheless, the Yoon administration confronts significant internal political challenges from its own people.
The summit could be considered as a crucial step toward resuming bilateral South Korean-Japanese ties, which resumed after Yoon’s inauguration in May 2022. Before yesterday’s summit in Tokyo, the two leaders had met four times. Better bilateral ties have also facilitated trilateral contacts between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, with the three nations hosting roughly 40 trilateral meetings in the previous year. To keep the sense of optimism going, Japan declared its intention to lift export limitations on certain chemicals used in the production of semiconductors and displays that have been imposed on South Korea since 2019, likely in reaction to the forced labor court verdict. South Korea’s trade minister indicated that his nation will abandon a World Trade Organization case against Tokyo. These moves present an opportunity for enhanced economic security cooperation, including supply chain coordination and resilience against Chinese economic pressure.
Kishida also announced that the two nations’ military cooperation and strategic discussions will restart at the vice-ministerial level. The talks will almost certainly culminate in the complete reinstatement of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which both nations signed in 2016, allowing them to exchange sensitive information. Enhanced security connections will aid in the strengthening of defense and deterrence on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. Keidanren, Japan’s biggest business association, has recently announced intentions to create a joint scholarship fund with South Korean corporations to boost youth exchanges. Yoon was joined by a group of South Korean business executives to meet with their Japanese counterparts. People-to-people interactions can help cement South Korea-Japan connections from the ground up, rather than only from the top down.
The Biden administration has been eager to applaud the diplomatic reconciliation between two of America’s closest allies. Separate but complementary remarks from the White House and the State Department welcomed the historic and promising new chapter between Japan and South Korea. While Washington urged both parties to pursue reconciliation and established political space for talks in trilateral forums, the latest attempts at rapprochement should be attributed to Seoul and Tokyo. The constant escalation of North Korea’s nuclear and missile threats, including a long-range missile test the morning of the Yoon-Kishida meeting, as well as worries over China’s challenge to the current rules-based regional order, have all contributed to improving South Korea-Japan ties. The two US partners are now taking practical efforts to strengthen security cooperation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region. All of this works favorably for Washington, which is attempting to rally like-minded friends and partners in order to maintain regional stability. As stated in the Phnom Penh Statement on US-Japan-Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific, the Biden administration would particularly welcome cooperation with its two allies on matters other than Northeast Asia. In 2018, Japan approved its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy before the United States. With South Korea releasing its own Indo-Pacific Strategy by the end of 2022, more collaboration is needed in areas such as new technology, climate change, and development financing, among others.
Possible solution through the way of memorialization and education
78 years after the war’s conclusion, reconciliation between Japan and South Korea must meet the wishes of the surviving war victims while also forcing both nations to rethink how they interact with their history. Any deal that relies mostly on apologies for external geopolitical security concerns or economic gains will have the same basic weaknesses as prior accords. Addressing the requests of victims has not been a fundamental component of Japan-South Korea reconciliation, security, or economic accords, which is why elite-led initiatives feel hollow. Short-term and state-centric goals promote cynicism among public hardened by years of short-lived accords, ensuring that the few survivors do not get closure. As a result, Washington’s engagement in mediation should be restricted in order to prevent the idea that reconciliation is just an impediment to be surmounted in order to concentrate on regional security challenges, particularly as the US has never completely acknowledged its role in covering up the original sin. Moreover, a restricted involvement of the United States in mediation would prevent the possibility of two significant friends misinterpreting anything less than complete support as a slur.
The Korean government and the public should assist, rather than obstruct, the willing acceptance of compensation. Despite the fact that hundreds of victims accepted it, the Moon administration shut down the fund created in 2015. Similarly, victims were prevented from receiving payments from the Asian Women’s Fund, which was established in 1995, since nonprofit groups pressed victims not to take Japanese money in order to get a special payout from the Korean government. Organizations that assist victims should only play a supportive role and should not speak or accept agreements on behalf of the real victims. Finally, the choices of relatives with legal standing to advocate for victims who have died or are incapable should be respected.
With the establishment of memorials and the dissemination of historical knowledge, the Japanese and Korean governments and their respective populations may ’move with’ history rather than ’moving on’ from the historical problems. Japan and South Korea’s relations should center on investments that have the potential to return „dividends,” which means they should contain activities that develop new areas of collaboration rather than placing a definitive mark on the past. Engaging with history, both in the here and now and in the future, critically is an effective strategy to prevent any diplomatic flare-ups that emerge from the politicization of historical concerns. The construction of memorials commemorating comfort women in South Korea and other countries across the globe has been the most contentious aspect of the comfort women problem in recent years. The demand of Japan to have the comfort women monument in front of the Japanese Embassy in Seoul removed was a major sticking point in the 2015 comfort women agreement. Third-party nations were likewise subjected to intense lobbying pressure from Japan and South Korea in relation to comparable statutes.
It is not necessary for statues remembering Korean victims of colonialism to have a hostile tone. Several already exist, such as the Monument in Memory of Korean Victims of the A-bomb in Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park and the Monument for Korean Atomic Victims in Nagasaki Peace Park. Both memorials make reference to the use of forced labor as the motivation for Koreans’ presence in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the years in which the atomic bombs were detonated. The building of both monuments was a difficult and highly political endeavor. Both arose from civil society pressure and grew in size and significance over time as the local and South Korean governments collaborated in their advancement. As a result of the successes of these two cases, it is possible that new memorials commemorating forced laborers and comfort women could be built; however, the nature of these memorials and their locations should be continuously negotiated in the interest of fostering better relations and developing a deeper comprehension of the events of the past going forward.
The establishment of peace museums would be an effective means of resolving disinformation and education shortages as well as developing constructive narratives around the relationship between Japan and South Korea. It is possible for museums dedicated to peace to play a significant part in the process of educating people about peace by bringing attention to the various meanings that can be ascribed to the concept of peace and by providing opportunities for visitors to contemplate, engage in conversation about, and take part in deliberated routes leading to both personal peace and cultures of peace. In Japan, such a place to reflect on Japan’s colonial history already exists, most notably at the Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum, the Nagasaki Atomic Bomb Museum, and the Women’s Active Museum on War and Peace in Tokyo, despite the fact that the issue is limited to only a small portion of the former two museums. A Japanese government-supported museum in Tokyo with a board of trustees comprising stakeholders from both nations would complement the War and Women’s Human Rights Museum in Seoul, which is primarily a point of contention between the two countries. By delegating power to the Japanese side, the Korean side recognizes Japan’s attempts to retain its peace identity.
Monuments and museums dedicated to peace leave behind a physical legacy for victims who will soon no longer be alive. In addition, museums and monuments are forward-looking because people will continue to visit them eternally, and the information presented in museums is continually revised, negotiated, and discussed. This discussion necessitates both parties critically examining how they have previously recounted history. In order to successfully negotiate this issue, both parties will need to do an in-depth analysis of how they have previously described the events. South Korea should not silence academic exploration of the complexities of the colonial era and should bring attention to the domestic discrimination that comfort women faced in the postwar era, which included ethnic Japanese. Japan must clearly condemn any reports that reject the coercive and brutal character of the comfort women system.
It would be arrogant of us to attempt to sketch out what the ultimate wording of a settlement with comfort women or forced workers ought to be. The victims should decide, in the privacy of negotiation chambers, what constitutes a sufficient apology, and the terms of that apology should only be made public at the victims’ request. In light of this, it is imperative that the governments of Japan and South Korea, as well as the general people in both countries, avoid reliving the past on their behalf and instead devote their energies to critically examining the past and finding new areas of collaboration. Taking responsibility for the past is just the first step, and establishing peace museums and monuments will demonstrate a concrete commitment to extending a sincere apology to victims and to advancing human rights in the future.
Summit’s implications
Even though the meeting has significant positive implications for a „future-oriented” relationship between South Korea and Japan, and by extension for trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and South Korea, more work needs to be done by all parties to cement newly discovered gains in bilateral relations. The opposition Democratic Party in South Korea referred to the agreement reached by the Yoon administration with Japan on the matter of forced labor as the „most humiliating moment” in South Korea’s diplomatic history. In the same vein, the opposition criticized Yoon for walking away from his meeting with Kishida without having been offered an apology first. According to the results of a recent survey, around 60% of people living in South Korea are against Yoon’s unilateral gesture to Japan. Opponents think that Yoon surrendered too much ground to Japan when he chose to let South Korean firms pay victims rather than Japanese corporations.
If Tokyo is willing to meet Seoul halfway on the reparation fund, it will be able to give the Yoon administration with more diplomatic cover, which will reduce the likelihood that domestic politics would once again derail ties between Korea and Japan. However, the Japanese corporate community has not provided any indication as of now on whether or not it will make voluntary contributions. Yoon also indicated that his administration would not require Japanese corporations to contribute money to the fund, and he said that this was something that they would not do. But, such approaches may help put an end to demonstrations in South Korea or, at the very least, bring to light the unyielding attitude of those Koreans who are reluctant to make any concessions in order to restore relations between South Korea and Japan.
When it comes to making extra gestures that seem to go beyond the 1965 bilateral agreement that Tokyo considers to have completely addressed all compensation concerns, Kishida certainly confronts his own set of political obstacles that he must overcome. Nevertheless, in order for this agreement to go through, Japan has to prove that it is sincere, that it is flexible, and that it has the same kind of guts that Yoon has shown in taking this route. If that were to happen, the political opposition in South Korea would have to show some self-control and refrain from undoing the Yoon-Kishida accord in the future.
Conclusion
Yet, strengthening relations between Seoul and Tokyo remains a significant objective. Both Japan and South Korea have a fundamental set of beliefs and interests in common that are distinct from those of the majority of other Asian nations. They are dedicated to protecting democratic political institutions, free and fair elections, and the right to speak one’s mind, assemble with others, and practice one’s religion, none of which are generally respected in the Asian area. Both countries are economic powerhouses with significant cultural impact and a great deal of soft power, despite the fact that they have a lot of difficulties in common. It is possible that friction among the area’s democracies may wind up further boosting its forceful dictatorships since authoritarian nations in the region, notably China, Russia, and North Korea are becoming more supportive of one other. In addition, mending the damaged trade ties between Japan and South Korea is essential to the well-being of the world economy at a time when interruptions to supply chains are becoming more common and economic nationalism is on the rise.
The leaders of South Korea and Japan were able to attain a significant milestone in the development of their bilateral ties as a result of the statesmanship shown by both Yoon and Kishida. It is inevitable that historical concerns may reemerge in South Korea’s relations with Japan; nevertheless, the succession of diplomatic actions made over the course of the last year between the two nations gives a chance to further strengthen cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.
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Cover photo from Pintereset.
